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I hope that I shall not be asked by the House to give any definite
account  of such measures as we are able to take.  If I were to set
them high,  I might raise false hopes; if I set them low,  I might
cause undue despondency  and alarm;  if I stated exactly what
they were, that would  be exactly  what the enemy would like to
know  (Churchill).
"Trade is war." So bluntly stated an Australian agricultural econo-
mist after returning from a stint at the Organization  for  Economic
Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  in Paris  (Young).  Commer-
cial  policy  has  always  been  a  form  of strategic  weapon.  Thomas
Jefferson,  discussing  relations  with the  Indian  tribes  in  1808,  re-
marked that "Commerce  is the great engine by which  we are  to co-
erce them, and not war."
A primary difference between the pre- and post-nuclear  age is the
reduced  appeal of force as a means of achieving  economic advan-
tage.  Because  modern  tactical  weapons  make  armed  engagements
riskier and more expensive,  Jefferson's dictum  has new appeal:  the
imperial  ambitions  of  nations  are  pursued through  economic  trade
policy.  What could be accomplished  in the  1930s and 40s by lethal
force is now pursued through economic expansionism.
The Call to Battle
Trade strategy  is thus defined,  like warfare,  primarily by national
interest  and involves threat,  counter-threat,  subterfuge  and retalia-
tion.  While  the rhetoric  of trade  may  lay claim  to higher principles,
such  as  "free  trade,"  "self-sufficiency,"  or "fair  trade,"  thinking  of
these principles  as calls to battle, rather than real objectives,  gives a
more accurate  impression of trade  diplomacy.  This paper will adopt
such a perspective  (Runge,  1988).
Churchill's  difficulty in making  full and accurate  statements  about
strategic  interests  to the House  of Commons  carries over  into the
problems  of U.S.  negotiators'  relations  with Congress.  If announced
public aims are set too high or too low for the Uruguay  Round of the
General Agreement  on  Tariffs and Trade (GATT),  false hopes  or
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The  MTN  process  in  Geneva  has wound  through nearly three
years of discussions  as part of the  1986-90  Uruguay  Round  (Bar-
kema, et al.).  In December,  1988,  a "midterm  review" meeting  in
Montreal ended  in discord,  when the United  States and EC failed to
bridge their fundamental  differences  over agriculture.  Additional
problems in three  of the fifteen  other  negotiating areas:  textiles,  in-
tellectual  property  and  safeguards,  also prevented  a  package  of
framework agreements designed to lay the groundwork  for the final
two years of the Uruguay Round.
Negotiations  Retrieve Midterm Review
However,  the midterm  review  was retrieved in April,  1989,  when
Geneva negotiations  resulted  in framework agreements  in the prob-
lem areas.  In agriculture,  the U.S./EC differences  were  papered
over with language that called for "substantial  progressive  reduc-
tions in agricultural  support  and protection  . . . resulting in correct-
ing and  preventing  restrictions  and distortions in world  agricultural
markets."
On the U.S.  side,  which had unsuccessfully called  for "elimina-
tion" of all trade distorting subsidies in Montreal,  the Geneva lan-
guage was interpreted as a lot of reform  in a hurry.  On the EC side,
it was interpreted  as modest reforms over an extended period.  The
long-term  goal of the Uruguay Round was reaffirmed  as  "a fair and
market-oriented  agricultural trading system."
Important Departures in Framework Agreement
Despite these  negotiating  nostrums  there were  several  important
departures  in  the  April framework  agreement  worthy  of  note
(Gifford).  Areas that had escaped scrutiny since 1947,  through seven
previous  GATT rounds,  were  targeted  for reform,  including  the
EC's variable levies and other countries'  voluntary export restraints.
In addition,  country-specific  policies previously  exempted from
GATT  rules and  given  special treatment  when  various  countries
joined GATT were put on the table for negotiation.  These policies
include the majority of Swiss agricultural subsidies,  Canadian wheat
import permits,  and the U.S. "Section  22"  import quotas.
The  midterm  review  also explicitly  identified  domestic  measures
as a source of trade distortion in need of reform and developed  a de-
tailed  work program with milestones, including  a first set of (unspec-
ified) long-term commitments  to occur in 1991.
In the short term,  the package agreed to in Geneva  capped the
level of domestic  and export support and protection  at "current"  lev-
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totally  forthcoming  would show one's hand before  it can be  played.
This  is what necessarily  makes trade  strategy even within the  com-
mittees of Congress so  much an insider's  game.  It is also what leads
many affected interests to fear they will be traded away as pawns.
War on Three Fronts
From the negotiators'  perspective,  we  can think  of the  final year
of the Uruguay Round as a war waged on three fronts.
The first is in Geneva,  where the multilateral trade negotiations
(MTN) will be played out, supposedly  in December,  1990. This multi-
lateral front,  and support for GATT as a mechanism for trade  re-
form,  is the most visible of the three.
The second front  involves the bilateral relationships  that  exist be-
tween individual countries, played out in national capitals.  These bi-
lateral relationships  include the  ongoing tensions  between Wash-
ington  and Brussels,  as  well  as  individual  discussions  with the
European  Community (EC) and its member states,  especially  in Lon-
don,  Bonn and Paris.  They also  include  Washington-Tokyo  rela-
tions,  and,  to a lesser degree,  those  with Cairns  Group members
such as  Canada,  Australia,  Brazil and  Argentina.  Because these bi-
lateral relations are  of longer and more permanent  duration than
those in GATT (where the Uruguay  Round is the eighth since World
War II) they are often more informative  and  influential.  It is often a
chain  of bilateral  deals that forms the basis for a multilateral  one  in
GATT.
The third,  and perhaps most important, front is the relationship
with Congress and affected interest groups. Along this home front is
to be found  the rear guard  of trade negotiation  and the  political
supply lines that give negotiating  authority  to the GATT negotiators
themselves.
Two aspects of this support from home are  vital to the Uruguay
Round process.  First,  any multilateral agreement  struck under
GATT must,  by law, be ratified  in Congress.  Those provisions deal-
ing with agriculture  will thus fall in part to the agricultural  subcom-
mittees and committees whose interests are most directly affected by
various  commodity  groups.  Second,  the timing  of the Uruguay
Round  will be interrelated  with Congressional  decisions over the
1990  farm bill,  making the domestic politics of agriculture  impossible
to disentangle  from trade strategy.
This paper will  discuss each  front:  1) the multilateral  negotiations
in Geneva;  2)  bilateral  negotiations;  and  3)  the home  front  negotia-
tions with Congress and affected interest groups.
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not imply that old legislation cannot  be changed  and current pro-
grams replaced,  unilaterally  or in coordination  with other countries.
How countries will roll back or eliminate existing trade or output dis-
tortions in 1990 and after was left vague.
Overall,  the midterm  review  package  provided  evidence  of prog-
ress in the Uruguay  Round,  but it is far from clear that the good in-
tentions it expressed  will be realized in a final  1990 package.
U.S.  Proposes  "Tariffication"
Immediately  following the April  accord,  relatively  little  was done
for several  months,  as  countries  allowed  themselves  relief over  the
fact that a midterm  agreement  had been reached  at all.  In the July
10 meeting of the Negotiating Group on Agriculture, however,  the
United States put forward  a major part of what  is emerging as its
final package  of proposals  (GATT Secretariat).  This is the so-called
"tariffication"  concept,  hailed by  The Economist as "the  most prom-
ising way yet suggested  to break out of GATT's agricultural thicket."
In brief,  tariffication means converting all nontariff import barriers
to  tariffs,  which can then be "bound"  and negotiated  downward
over time.  Bound  (or fixed)  tariffs are the preferred  method  of im-
port protection under GATT law.
The U.S. proposal suggested the difference between domestic  and
world  prices be used as the basic measure of tariff equivalence.  For
example,  a quota increases  domestic prices  by reducing the amount
of supply available  to consumers  at the world price.  The  difference
between the world price and the higher domestic  price is equivalent
to a tariff of that  amount.  If the  domestic price  for the product  in
question  during  the reference  period  is  100,  and  the world  price  is
50, the tariff equivalent would be 100 percent  =  [(100 - 50)/]  x  100.
Tariffication Faces  Resistance
The tariffication  proposal sounds reasonable in the abstract,  but is
sure  to encounter  resistance  from those sectors most reliant on
quotas and  other nontariff protection  for their  livelihood.  In the
United  States,  this includes those protected  by dairy,  sugar, tobacco
and  peanut  import  quotas.  There  are  also  a  variety  of technical
problems in calculating tariff equivalents,  including the choice of ref-
erence prices and base period.  The Economist also presages, "as tar-
iffication  proceeds,  some  countries  may  be tempted  to impose  new
import restrictions in the form of product standards,  such as sanitary
and phytosanitary restrictions."
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Tariffication may be thought of as the import protection  side of the
U.S.  proposal.  In  addition  to this there  will  be provisions  for even-
tual  removal of export subsidies and output  distorting domestic  pol-
icies.  At  the  moment,  the  U.S.  Trade  Representative's  Office
(USTR)  and U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  (USDA)  are preparing
a  larger U.S.  proposal for submission to  GATT  in October or
November,  1989,  of which tariffication  is one part.
The new proposal will include explicit treatment  of export  sub-
sidies,  internal subsidies,  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  measures  and
GATT rules and disciplines.
While  Carla Hills  and Clayton Yeutter will lead the negotiations at
the highest level,  the operating U.S.  team,  led by Richard Crowder
of USDA and Ambassador Jules Katz of USTR,  will be represented
in Geneva  by Ambassador  Rufus Yerxe  (formerly  Representative
Dan Rostenkowski's  chief trade aid).  The staff level team will be led
by Joe O'Mara at USDA and Suzanne  Early at USTR and repre-
sented in Geneva by Deputy Chief of Mission Andrew Stoler.
U.S.  Proposal Illustrated
It may  be useful to illustrate  the concept  underlying  the evolving
U.S.  proposal (Runge and Taff).  In general,  trade-distorting mea-
sures may be thought of in terms of their effect on (a) exports,  (b) im-
ports and (c) output.  Tariff equivalents describe distortions on the
import side while subsidies describe them on the export side. Output
distortions  resulting  from internal  policies  are derived  with  respect
to their effect on production  in domestic  markets. In each case,  pol-
icies may either promote or retard exports, imports  or output.
Export Distorting Policies
With  respect  to exports,  a policy  has a distorting trade effect  if
either buyers or sellers in the domestic  market face  different  condi-
tions from those  who participate  in the cross-border market.  Such a
definition encompasses not only policies that affect the difference be-
tween  export  and domestic  prices,  such as export taxes  and sub-
sidies, but also nonprice  protective barriers such as voluntary export
restraints.
As shown in Figure  1, such policies may distort trade either by ar-
tificially promoting  exports (as in the case of the Export Enhance-
ment Program)  or by artificially retarding them (as in the case of Ar-
gentine export taxes or voluntary export restraints).
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Policies  Rated for Phase Out
Over the remainder  of the Uruguay  Round,  the attempt will be to
define  and to set GATT-negotiated  limits  for each country  on those
policies that are  definitely slated for elimination,  preferably  as soon
as possible ("Red Light"  policies);  those that may  remain in place  in
the short  run, but  are to be modified  and reformed  during a transi-
tion phase  ("Yellow Light"  policies);  and those  that  are sufficiently
nondistorting  to remain  in  place  indefinitely  ("Green  Light"
policies).
Import Distorting Policies
Similarly,  with  respect to imports,  a policy  has a  distorting trade
effect if either buyers or sellers in the domestic market face different
conditions from those who participate in the cross-border market. As
shown in Figure  2,  policies  that retard  imports,  such  as quotas,  ex-
plicit tariffs,  or health,  safety and other sanitary or phytosanitary re-
strictions,  are  one  side  of such distortions.  Less frequently  men-
tioned  are policies  that artificially  promote  imports.  An  example
might be  environmental  regulations  on fruit  and  vegetable  produc-
tion prohibiting  the  use of certain  cost-saving  chemicals  in the
United  States leading to incentives to import foreign fruit and vege-
tables on  which such chemicals  have been  used.  Because  domestic
growers  quickly realize such regulations  have this effect,  calls for
import protection  through  health and safety  standards applied
equally to foreign  produce are quickly heard, converting the regula-
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tions from import-promoting  to import-retarding  policies  (Runge,
1990).  In  principle,  either type of distortion can  be expressed  as a
tariff equivalent,  with import  promoting  policies  defined  as  a nega-
tive  tariff.  Once  again,  the issue  is which  policies are determined to
be  definitely out-of-bounds  ("Red Light"),  which are undesirable
and to be phased  out over time ("Yellow  Light") and  which are ac-
ceptable ("Green Light").
Domestic  Production Distorting Policies
Finally,  there  are those policies  affecting domestic  production.  As
shown in Figure  3,  such policies may be negative,  such as U.S.  and
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(Set-asides)  (Price supports)European set-aside  programs that pay farmers not to produce;  or
they may be positive,  such as price  supports tied to specific  crop
yields and acres of production.
The goal  of U.S.  domestic  agricultural  policy  in the Bush  admin-
istration  is generally  to eliminate  policies that  are most distortive  of
production  decisions  ("Red  Light"  policies),  including  large  set-
asides and high price supports,  and to phase out ("Yellow  Light"
policies) those that have tended to distort production over time, such
as crop-specific  acreage bases.  What remains ("Green Light" pol-
icies)  will  be programs  in which farmers  are relatively  free to plant
whatever crops  are most in market demand,  with support  paid,  not
to specific  crops, but on the basis of some type of income criteria.
Overall, progress in the present GATT negotiations can be defined
as an agreement  to eliminate a specific  set of "Red Light" policies  in
each realm (exports,  imports,  and  output)  with a  well-defined  time-
table, and to designate a set of "Yellow  Light"  policies for discussion
in subsequent years.
Aggregate  Measures 'Underidentify' Problem
It  seems  inevitable  that  successful  negotiations  will  ultimately  in-
volve  agreements  to end specific policies, and that such political  de-
cisions cannot be finessed by an agreement simply to achieve an ag-
gregate level of support or level of tariff or subsidy. This is the route
sometimes suggested by advocates of a single aggregate  measure,
such as  the Producer  Subsidy  Equivalent  (PSE). As  Hertel  has re-
cently shown,  a given reduction in the aggregate level of support can
be  achieved with a myriad  of different  options,  many of which have
extremely different effects  on exports,  imports and output.  His
analysis shows that aggregate  measures,  because they abstract from
this  complexity,  "underidentify"  the problem,  and  thus do  not pro-
vide sufficient discipline to achieve longlasting reform (1989a,  1989b).
Key  Battles  Identified
Before turning to the bilateral and home fronts, let me touch on
the relationship  between  agriculture  and several other  key areas  of
the  Uruguay  Round negotiations.  While  publicly  stating  that all  fif-
teen areas are crucial,  the tactical importance  attached to some is
greater  than to others.  This  is sufficiently  well-known  to the  nego-
tiators themselves that it does not seem seditious to state  them. The
"enemy"  already  knows which battles will be key.
Agriculture,  throughout  the Uruguay  Round,  has been crucial,
and remains so. Minimum results must be achieved in agriculture for
the U.S. trade strategy to be successful.
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largely due to  the  substantial interests  of the American  financial
community.
The  remaining three areas of vital importance  are Trade-Related
Investment  Measures  (TRIMS);  Trade  in  Intellectual  Property
(TRIPS); and the negotiations  on Subsidies.  It is beyond the scope of
this paper to discuss these areas,  each of which  would require treat-
ments  of similar length.
The Bilateral Front
Despite  the emphasis on multilateral negotiations,  a large  share of
negotiating gets done in capitals.  Several examples are illustrative  of
the importance  of this bilateral front.
In  agriculture,  an  important  issue with  Europe has been the  con-
tinuing  dispute over  beef hormones.  On January  1,  1989,  the  Euro-
pean Community announced  a ban on all U.S.  beef imports contain-
ing hormones used to increase cattle  growth.  Citing health risks, the
EC  action touched  off a  cycle  of retaliation  that  has  affected  the
world trading system (Bredahl).
Growing Role of Nontariff Import Barriers
This apparently isolated example  of health regulations  acting as
trade barriers  is part  of an emerging  pattern  of environmental  and
health issues  with major  consequences  for world  trade.  The  larger
significance of the hormones  dispute relates to the growing role of
nontariff import barriers, especially justified on health, safety  and
environmental  grounds.  As noted above, the temptation to use such
sanitary and phytosanitary  restrictions  is increasing  for a variety  of
reasons.
In  the  high income  countries  of Europe and  North  America,
health,  safety  and  environmental  regulations  are  especially  attrac-
tive candidates  for use as nontariff barriers.  They are part of a
larger  problem:  environmental  and health  risks  are  increasingly
traded among nations along with goods and services.
Risks of Disservices  Slighted
While increasing  emphasis  is  given to the growing  role of services
trade, comparatively  little has been directed  to risks that are the op-
posite of services:  environmental  and health disservices traded
across national borders.  This problem arises  directly from the trans-
fer  of technology  and will increasingly  affect  international  invest-
ment flows, product liability, trade and development and the relative
competitiveness  of U.S. business (Runge,  1990).
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mental  regulation  results  from increasingly  stringent rules  and reg-
ulations  and a rising concern with environmental  quality and human
health among wealthy nations.
Pursuit of Growth Results in 'Environmental Arbitrage'
In most developing  countries, however,  rapid economic  growth re-
mains the primary  focus of concern.  This creates incentives to ex-
port restricted  industrial materials-or  whole  production  proc-
esses-from  North to South.  A kind of "environmental  arbitrage"
results,  in which  profits are  gained by  exploiting  the differential  in
regulations.
In the United  States,  for example,  the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide,  and  Rodenticide  Act  (FIFRA),  the Safe  Drinking  Water
Act (SDWA)  and the 1990  farm bill are all likely to be amended in
ways that effectively constrain  chemical and land use choices.  These
are  but several examples  that may lead  multinational firms to ex-
pand in markets where regulatory oversight is less constraining.
This environmental arbitrage results from conscious  policy choices
that reveal differences in the value attached  to environmental  quali-
ty by rich and poor  countries.  As these paths of institutional innova-
tion increasingly  diverge,  so  will the  differential  impact  of environ-
mental constraints  on businesses  in Europe,  North  America  and,
say, Argentina and Brazil.
The competitiveness implications  of these trends are not lost  on
developed  country firms.  They have been quick  to see  the trade
relevance  of environmental  and  health standards  in limiting  access
both to  developing  country  competition  and  other  developed  coun-
tries.  Growing  consumer concerns  with health and the environment
create a natural (and much larger)  constituency for nontariff barriers
to trade.
It is doubtful,  for  example,  that beef-offal  merchants  in the  Euro-
pean Community  could  have blocked  competitive  U.S. imports
solely  in the name  of superior  French or German beef kidneys.  But
the hormones question created  a large,  vocal and committed  constit-
uency for denying U.S.  access to this market.
These distortions threaten more liberal international  trade in ways
that are damaging  to both developed  and developing  country  inter-
ests, yet are not widely appreciated.
Bilateral, Multilateral Fronts Related
The beef hormones dispute,  while a relatively minor bilateral dis-
pute  in terms  of total  trade  value  ($100  million  annually),  thus  illus-
trates the importance  of bilateral trade  diplomacy in conditioning
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arate,  the  bilateral and multilateral  fronts  of the trade  war nonethe-
less relate  to  one  another,  if for no  other reason than because  they
both draw down on the fighting strength of U.S. negotiators.
Possible  North American Bloc  Questioned
A second  current  example concerns  the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement  (FTA) concluded  in 1988.  This bilateral accord,  heralded
as  a triumph for trade liberalization,  nonetheless  raises questions  in
many capitals  over the possible  evolution of a North American trad-
ing bloc,  which might, together with a unified Europe after  1992, end
up destabilizing  world  trade.  In his  40th anniversary  speech  to the
GATT contracting parties in Geneva,  former Federal Reserve Chair-
man Paul Volcker warned of just such an eventuality.  Because Can-
ada  is  a member  of the  Cairns  group,  the Ottawa/Washington  cable
traffic  inevitably  causes FTA  issues to be checked  against GATT
strategy  to coordinate  the two fronts.  In  agriculture,  much of the
FTA language refers specifically to the need for such coordination.
U.S.-Japan  Agreement  Key
A third bilateral relationship of key importance  is with Tokyo.  The
bilateral  agreement  struck between  the United  States and Japan  on
access  to Japanese  markets  for beef in  mid-1988,  for example,  pro-
vided a recipe  for the  1989  U.S.  tariffication  proposal  to GATT.  The
deal with Tokyo first determined that quotas and other nontariff bar-
riers to trade were equivalent  to a tariff of 96 percent.  It was then
agreed  to phase out the quotas  and other nontariff measures  and to
replace them with a tariff of 70  percent in 1991.  Finally,  tariff cuts to
60 percent  in  1992  and 50  percent in  1993  were scheduled,  with fur-
ther cuts to be negotiated as part of the multilateral process.
These three examples of bilateral relations-with the  EC, Canada,
and Japan-illustrate  the significance  of the second front of trade
warfare.  Trade policy  analysts who focus  only on the multilateral
front,  and neglect the bilateral  role,  fail  to  see that both are  crucial
to victory.
There  is yet  a third front of greater importance  even than these
two, because  it involves the political supply lines of trade  negotia-
tion.
The Home  Front: Relations  with Congress  and Interest Groups
The capacity  successfully  to resolve trade negotiations  as complex
and overriding as the GATT talks depends crucially on effective liai-
son with Congress and affected interest groups.  In agriculture,  there
will clearly be winners  and losers from the Uruguay  Round,  al-
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losers.  Win  or lose,  no one who farms or is affected  by farming
wants to feel that a  democratically  elected  government can make
major  changes  in policy without  consulting those  most  seriously  af-
fected by these changes.  Failing to consult with such groups is politi-
cal folly  in any  event,  as  administration  after administration  has
learned.  When Woodrow  Wilson  went off to Europe  to create  a
League  of Nations designed  to  end all  wars,  he failed to  protect
these  political supply lines,  and  was dumfounded  when  Congress
failed to ratify the treaty.  His actions contributed to an isolationist re-
sponse that helped bring on World War II.
Successful  Home Front Strategy
There  are two elements  of successful  trade  strategy on the home
front.  The first requires directly  involving the members  of Congress
whose  committees  bear  responsibility  for trade  matters  so  they de-
velop  a  feel  for  what  negotiators  cryptically  refer  to  as  the
"modalities"  of this process.  Earlier  this year,  House Agriculture
Committee  Chairman "Kika"  de la Garza left for Geneva in a highly
agitated state,  worried that "the  farm bill was being written in
Switzerland."  The trip turned out well and helped to allay his fears.
Other  key members of Congress,  including  Senator Patrick Leahy,
chairman of the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee;  Dan
Rostenkowski,  chairman of House  Ways and  Means;  and Sam  Gib-
bons,  chairman  of the  Trade  Subcommittee  of Ways and Means,
have all been briefed in Geneva on the process.
Beyond the members of Congress, and perhaps even more impor-
tant, stand the interest groups that exert enormous influence over
Congressional  decision-making  (Rapp). In agriculture,  these  include
the  commodity groups and general  farm organizations  as well as the
agribusiness sector.
At USTR,  an elaborate  network  of policy advisory councils,  com-
posed of thousands of representatives of U.S. business,  labor and
farmers,  meets  regularly with  negotiators  to provide  input  into the
process.  The highest  level of this pyramid  of advisory committees  is
the President's Advisory Committee  on Trade Negotiations  (ACTN),
a general  advisory board  on which agriculture is prominently repre-
sented.  Members  have included the head of the American Farm Bu-
reau  Federation  and  the  California  Almond  Growers  Exchange,
among others.
Despite these formal advisory groups, much more must be done
outside  Washington to inform  (and be informed  by) farm interest
groups  as  the final year  of the Uruguay  Round commences.  This is
especially  significant  in light of the simultaneity  of the farm bill and
GATT processes (Drabenscott, et al.).
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In my view there  are two tactical  concerns that will dominate  the
home  front.  The  first is the likely  development  of a large  "war
chest"  of threatened  export subsidies,  perhaps  in the  form of "mar-
keting  loans  across board,"  if the  GATT talks fail.  This  is what nu-
clear strategists refer to as a "credible  threat,"  one form of which is
MAD,  for  "mutually  assured  destruction."  The problem,  of course,
is that to work,  the threat must be credible;  but to be credible,  it
must be disastrous for all concerned.  Despite these risks,  I expect to
see some such threat emerge from the 1990 farm bill process.
The second tactical issue on the home front concerns what I would
call weak points in the domestic  line. These weak points are defined
precisely  around  commodities  heavily  protected  from  foreign  com-
petition  by U.S.  law,  and thus standing  to lose the most from trade
liberalization.
Uncoincidentally,  these are the commodities that have the most
highly  developed  lobbying  skills  in  Congress.  Examples  include
sugar,  some parts  of the dairy industry (especially  outside  the  Mid-
west,  in California and Florida),  and other, smaller commodities  like
peanuts.  Despite  the fact that the beneficiaries  of these programs
are few  (10,000  sugar producers  receive $1.5  billion annually,  ac-
cording to one recent estimate),  they happen to be located in places
like Kika de la Garza's  district in Texas and in the Red River Valley
of Minnesota  (Mehra).
Weak points in a line, in my view, should not be exposed  to undue
fire  or the  entire tide  of battle may  be turned.  I thus  am inclined to
suggest an aggressive  liberalization  thrust at our  strongest points
(feed  grains,  oilseeds),  saving  weaker  commodities  for  subsequent
treatment.  While  some  argue  that such an approach  is "inconsis-
tent," it  is far from clear that consistency  is the path  to reform,  any-
more than an effective assault requires uniform pressure along all
points in the line.
Conclusion
In conclusion,  I have described three  fronts of the battle for trade
liberalization:  the multilateral,  bilateral and  home fronts.  Each  is
vital  to the process  of trade  liberalization,  and  each  will require  its
own  approaches.  Yet  all must be planned  and executed  in a coordi-
nated  fashion.  Little  wonder  that trade  liberalization  comes  slowly.
But a war is not won in a day.
REFERENCES
Barkema,  Alan,  David  Henneberry,  and  Mark  Drabenscott.  "Agriculture  and  the  GATT:  A  Time  for  Change."
Economic Review,  pp.  21-42. Kansas  City MO: Federal Reserve  Bank of Kansas City, Feb.,  1989.
Bredahl, Maury  E. "The  U.S./E.C. Growth Promoter  Dispute:  Tempest, Symbol,  and Portent."  Economic &  Pol-
icy Information  for Missouri Agriculture, no.  5 (May  1989).
36Churchill,  Sir  Winston  S.  "The  War  Situation." Into Battle,  10th  ed.,  p.  309.  London,  England:  Cassel  and  Co.
Ltd.,  1943.
Drabenscott,  Mark, Alan Barkema,  and David  Henneberry.  "Agriculture  and the GATT: The Link  to U.S. Farm
Policy." Economic Review, pp. 3-24.  Kansas City MO: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, May,  1989.
The Economist. "A GATTling Gun for Farms."  8 July, 1989,  pp. 15-16.
GATT Secretariat.  "Discussion  Paper on Tariffication."  Paper MTN.GNG/N65/W/97  submitted by the United
States Negotiating  Group on Agriculture  at  the Multilateral  Trade Negotiations,  the Uruguay  Round,  Geneva,
Switzerland,  10 July,  1989.
Gifford,  M.  N.  "Current  Status  of the Agricultural  Negotiations  in the  MTN and the Positions  of the  Major Play-
ers."  Agriculture in  the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations. Proceedings  of a conference.  Guelph  ONT:  De-
partment  of Agricultural Economics and Business,  University  of Guelph, July,  1989.
Hertel,  Thomas W.  "PSEs and the Mix  of Measures  to Support Farm Incomes."  The World Economy, no.  1 (March
1989a),  pp. 17-27.
. "Negotiating  Reductions in Agricultural  Support:  Implications  of Technology  and Factor  Mobility."  Amer.
J. Agr. Econ. 71(1989b):  559-573.
Mehra, Rekha.  "Winners and Losers in the U.S. Sugar Program."  Resources, no. 94 (Winter 1989),  pp. 5-7.
Rapp,  David. How the U.S. Got into Agriculture: And Why It Can't Get Out. Washington  DC: Congressional  Quar-
terly Inc.,  1988.
Runge, Carlisle Ford.  "The Assault  on Agricultural  Protectionism."  Foreign  Affairs, no.  1 (Fall 1988),  pp.  133-150.
Runge,  C. Ford.  "Trade in Disservices:  Environmental Regulation and Agricultural Trade Competitiveness."
Water Quality and Agriculture: International  Perspectives on Policy, ed. J.  B. Braden.  Boulder CO: Lynne
Reiner, forthcoming, 1990.
Runge,  C.  Ford, and Steven  J.  Taff.  "The Uruguay  Round  Negotiations  and Agricultural Trade."  Increasing Un-
derstanding  of Public Problems and Policies-1988,  pp.  164-173.  Oak Brook IL: Farm  Foundation,  1988.
Young, Michael.  Personal communication, April  14, 1989.
37Family Policy